September 11 as Accelerator

This thread follows the argument that the September 11 attacks intensified political tendencies already underway rather than creating an entirely new direction.

increasingBearing stren­gth in each eventdecreasing

Bush Doctrine Example

Bush Doctrine Example A preexisting direction The Bush administration's doctrine is offered as an illustration of tendencies that predate the attacks. The event becomes an opportunity to strengthen an existing political course. Acceleration, not origin This distinction shapes the passage's explanation: the attacks matter profoundly, but they do not explain every policy that follows.

The Long-Term Question

The Long-Term Question From event to trajectory The author turns from immediate reactions to the longer-term consequences of the September 11 attacks. The focus is on what the attacks might accelerate. Existing tendencies The forecast rests on the claim that important political directions were already established before the attacks occurred.

Governments Seize Opportunity

Governments Seize Opportunity Wider political use Governments around the world use the attacks to introduce or intensify severe and repressive measures, according to the author's account. A common opening The attacks create a shared political justification, while local governments pursue their own priorities under its cover.

Initial Predictions Confirmed

Initial Predictions Confirmed The forecast tested The author summarizes the early pattern as confirmation of predictions made at the outset. Governments have used the crisis in ways the argument anticipated. Evidence through policy Confirmation comes not from a single event but from parallel developments: domestic discipline, expanded military reach, and stronger claims of authority.

Uneasy Changes Ahead

Uneasy Changes Ahead Continuity and change The author concludes that fundamental international problems mostly remain, while the attacks have nevertheless introduced consequential changes. An unsettled future Some consequences may be significant and unpleasant. The ending resists both the claim that everything changed and the claim that nothing did.

As the author introduces the long-term forecast

At the beginning of the final forecast

In the first period after the attacks

After the first post-attack policy changes

At the final assessment of consequences